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Abstract 
 
The goal of this paper is to develop a comprehensive research agenda to analyze trends in domestic 
outsourcing in the U.S. — firms’ use of contractors and independent contractors — and its effects 
on job quality and inequality. In the process, we review definitions of outsourcing, the available 
scant empirical research, and limitations of existing data sources. We also summarize theories that 
attempt to explain why firms contract out for certain functions and assess their predictions about 
likely impacts on job quality. We then lay out in detail a major research initiative on domestic 
outsourcing, discussing the questions it should answer and providing a menu of research 
methodologies and potential data sources. Such a research investment will be a critical resource for 
policymakers and other stakeholders as they seek solutions to problems arising from the changing 
nature of work. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Stagnant wages, growing inequality, and the deterioration of job quality are among the most 
important challenges facing the U.S. economy today. Although domestic outsourcing — firms’ use 
of contractors, franchises, and independent contractors — is a potentially important mechanism 
through which companies reduce compensation and shift economic risk to workers, surprisingly 
little is known about the extent of this practice and its implications for wages and working 
conditions. Our review of the available research suggests that domestic outsourcing takes place on a 
much larger scale and affects many more workers than has been recognized — ranging from low-
wage service workers such as janitors, security guards, warehouse workers, and hotel housekeepers 
to professional and technical workers such as programmers, health care technicians, and 
accountants. These trends are part of a structural change in the organization of production and work 
across firms that we suspect is profoundly affecting the quality of jobs and the nature of the 
employment contract for a significant portion of the American workforce (Weil 2014).  
 
The goal of this paper is to develop a comprehensive research agenda to analyze trends in domestic 
outsourcing in the U.S. and its effects on the quality of jobs — including wages, benefits, employee 
skills and discretion at work, training and mobility opportunities, and job security — as well as 
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inequality across jobs. In the process, we review definitions of outsourcing, the available scant 
empirical research, and limitations of existing data sources. We also summarize theories that attempt 
to explain why firms contract out for certain functions and assess their predictions about likely 
impacts on job quality. We then lay out in detail a major research initiative on domestic outsourcing, 
discussing the questions it should answer and providing a menu of research methodologies and 
potential data sources.  
 
In our view, such a research investment will be a critical resource for policymakers and other 
stakeholders as they seek solutions to problems arising from the changing nature of work. Domestic 
outsourcing has potentially important implications for the adequacy of existing employment and 
labor laws; the provision of health, pension, and other workplace benefits; and workplace 
enforcement strategies — all topics of current debates that could be informed by better data and 
research.  
 
 
The Problem 
Firms’ choices regarding the organization of work and production play a critical role in shaping the 
skill requirements of jobs, the level and distribution of wages, and working conditions. This is well-
documented in the sociological research on job quality (Kalleberg 2013), the industrial relations 
literature (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986), and the management literature (Cappelli 1999). In 
particular, industry-based empirical research has documented how variation in employer strategies 
between firms in the same industry has led to variation in the quality of jobs (Appelbaum, 
Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; Gautie and Schmitt 2010). That research typically focused on 
comparing work restructuring within the establishments of primary firms and showed how 
managerial choices to pursue value-added or cost-focused strategies often lead to differences in the 
quality of jobs for workers in the same occupation or with the same skill level.  
 
We believe that the next step for understanding how firm strategies affect the quality of jobs and 
inequality is to study more systematically the reallocation of labor across organizations, as a result of 
firms contracting with other firms (or independent contractors) for goods and services. We refer to 
this process as domestic outsourcing or contracting out. Based on existing research and imperfect 
datasets, we suspect that firms have increased their use of outsourcing and that the effects of the 
reallocation of jobs across firms are at least as salient as the reorganization of work within firms that 
has been more typically studied (Weil 2014). If we are correct, then this raises the possibility that the 
rise of domestic outsourcing may have contributed to growing wage inequality, which would help to 
explain recent research findings that the majority of the increase in inequality has occurred between 
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firms (Barth et al. 2014; Handwerker and Spletzer 2015).1 We also suspect that variation in firms’ 
contracting decisions leads to quite different labor market outcomes, depending on such factors as 
ownership structures and market pressures, industry and occupation, motivation for contracting, and 
power relations between the primary firm and different tiers of contractors. For example, 
outsourcing overflow work in high or uncertain demand conditions or to take advantage of 
specialized expertise or technology may have different implications for worker outcomes than 
outsourcing of functions previously performed in-house in order to reduce labor costs.  
 
Contracting out is difficult to define because, in the broadest sense, a large part of economic activity 
has always occurred through business-to-business transactions, as captured in macro-economic 
input-output models. Our observation, however, is that the scale and scope of contracting for goods 
and services production has changed in fundamental ways in recent decades, and that this change — 
and its implications for the quality of jobs — needs to be conceptualized more clearly and examined 
empirically. In the past, much of value creation occurred within large enterprises; in recent decades, 
however, the vertical disintegration of large corporations has led to more value creation through 
decentralized production networks, resulting in a larger proportion of productive activity occurring 
through business-to-business contracting.  
 
While this transformation has been the focus of considerable research in its international form (the 
offshoring of work in global supply chains), until recently the domestic counterpart has received 
relatively little scholarly attention. This, despite some evidence suggesting that the growth in 
offshore outsourcing has been accompanied by growth in domestic outsourcing (Yuskavage, 
Strassner, and Medeiros 2008) and the fact that the majority of production in supply chains is still 
domestic or regional (Rugman, Li, and Oh 2009).  
 
Specifically, we lack research on three fronts: the prevalence and different patterns of firm-level 
contracting within and across industries; the factors driving contracting out; and the relationship 
between these patterns and the quality of jobs at the workplace. First, inadequate and incomplete 
data mean that it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of domestic outsourcing of various business 
functions across sectors of the economy or the number of workers affected by it, though estimates 
are feasible for several specific industries and occupations (Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 2010). 
Similarly, our understanding of variation in contracting strategies within and across industries is thin, 
but initial research suggests that the stylized view of domestic outsourcing as a linear supply chain or 
a unidirectional process of economic fragmentation is inadequate (Gospel and Sako 2010). 
 
                                                 
1  Indeed, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) show that the outsourcing of cleaning, food, security, and logistics services accounts 
for a sizable share of the growth in wage inequality in Germany since the 1980s. 
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Second, we lack a clear understanding of the factors that are driving domestic outsourcing — and by 
extension, whether firm decisions about what to retain in-house and what to outsource have 
changed over time. At a general level, market deregulation, heightened competition, technological 
change, and the rising influence of institutional investors and shareholders have put severe pressure 
on U.S. firms to reduce costs and headcount and increase quality and responsiveness to consumer 
demand. Some evidence suggests that firms have responded by focusing on their “core 
competencies” and outsourcing peripheral or low value-added tasks as well as higher value-added 
specialized functions. Advanced technologies have facilitated this process by allowing firms to 
outsource entire functions and more easily monitor contractors as well as employees who work 
virtually, leading to new forms of networked production and the rise of specialized firms. But few 
studies provide a more fine-grained empirical analysis of which factors are more salient for different 
industries or how these differences lead to distinct forms of outsourcing and contracting 
relationships — and in turn, differential outcomes for workers.  
 
Third and most important, we lack robust research on how domestic outsourcing and the nature of 
the relationship between contracting firms affects wages and other dimensions of job quality, such 
as benefits, hours, workload, job stability, schedule stability, occupational safety and health, 
incidence of wage theft, and access to training and promotions. As we will see, some of the 
theoretical frameworks in this area predict that job quality and mobility opportunities will suffer 
when jobs that do not require a college degree are contracted out. Predictions are less clear for other 
cases — for example, jobs requiring professional, technical, or specialized skills, or those that are 
outsourced to large and diversified contractors. The impacts of the rise of on-demand platforms — 
such as Uber, TaskRabbit, and Upwork — are especially difficult to study because the work 
constitutes a collection of micro jobs (“gigs”) that often supplement individuals’ income from a 
main job; as a result, government surveys of workers are likely to miss some portion of this work 
activity.  
 
In sum, our review of existing research suggests a substantial lack of knowledge about domestic 
outsourcing in the U.S. — its prevalence and the various forms it takes, its causes, and its effects on 
job quality and inequality. 
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2. Defining Domestic Outsourcing 
 
In producing goods and services for final demand, firms may choose to perform certain functions 
in-house or they may contract with other firms for those inputs. For example, companies may 
perform manufacturing, transportation, research and development, IT services, accounting, or 
cleaning functions in-house, or they may outsource those functions by contracting with another 
firm. Changes in the mix of this “make or buy” decision over time have been variously labeled the 
vertical disintegration of the firm, the changing boundary of the firm, the growth of networked 
production, and so forth. We review different academic approaches to this question in the next 
section. 
 
Specifically, we define domestic outsourcing as firms or governmental entities located in the U.S. contracting with 
other firms or individuals located in the U.S. for the provision of goods and services. In this definition, we include 
the outsourcing of functions that used to be performed in-house, new activities that have emerged 
as contract services from the start, and activities that have always been outsourced but where the 
scale or nature of the outsourcing has changed. Types of contractors include suppliers or vendors of 
goods (such as manufacturing inputs) or services (such as business services or staffing firms), 
franchisees, and independent contractors (such as freelancers, independent consultants, or on-
demand platform workers).2  
 
In order to capture important changes in the organization of work across firms and its implications 
for workers, our definition of domestic outsourcing is broad in scope. Given that research on this 
topic is at an early stage, we think it is prudent to take an empirical approach to identifying the range 
of forms that outsourcing may take, rather than eliminating certain categories from the start. This 
will help ensure that we capture the full extent of change in the organization of production and its 
impact on workers. We do not, for example, limit the definition of domestic outsourcing to 
purchased services, as in Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008).3 Note that while we include 
purchases of both goods and services in our definition, not all contracting for materials and services 
inputs are of interest. For example, firms have always purchased office supplies, and absent any 
indication that the scope or nature of contracting for these products has significantly changed, the 
                                                 
2  We only include true independent contractors in this definition, though in practice, misclassification may be one of the strategies 
that accompany contracting out. 
3  For other examples of related definitions, see Berlingieri (2014); Brown, Sturgeon, and Lane (2014); and Weil (2014). 
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contracting for office supplies would not be a good candidate for study. In contrast, there has been 
significant restructuring of domestic manufacturing supply chains with greater reliance on suppliers 
and subcontractors, and the changing relations of power between primary and contractor firms have 
important implications for the quality of jobs and inequality. In practice, researchers may choose to 
focus their analysis on a particular industry; certain types of outsourced functions, such as business 
support services; or one form of contracting, such as franchising.  
 
Figure 1 distinguishes between several levels of analysis that research on domestic outsourcing 
should examine. A first distinction is between changes at the firm level, in the organization of 
production, and changes at the job or workplace level, in the organization of work (Grimshaw, Willmott, 
and Rubery 2005). Ultimately, we are interested in the effects of domestic outsourcing on job quality 
and workers, but this first distinction requires understanding changes in the organization of production at 
the firm level. Outsourcing is an action by a firm and should be defined and measured at that level; 
this is the first level of analysis. The empirical question then becomes, what is the impact of firm-
level outsourcing decisions on the organization of work at the establishment level and, by extension, the 
quality of jobs. This is the second level of analysis. In addition, the potential growth of on-demand 
gig work as well as other forms of job fragmentation suggest a third level of analysis: worker outcomes 
across jobs. Here, the question is how workers are bundling multiple forms of income-generating work 
to achieve economic security, and how they are building careers across jobs and over time.  
 
 
Relationship between Domestic Outsourcing and 
Nonstandard Work 
An important feature of our framework is that it clarifies the relationship between domestic 
outsourcing and contingent or nonstandard work. Although there is no consensus on what 
constitutes “nonstandard” employment, to illustrate how it differs from work that has been 
outsourced, we use the categories identified in the BLS CPS Supplement on Contingent and 
Alternative Work Arrangements: direct-hire temporaries, agency temporaries, on-call workers, day 
laborers, contract workers performing work at the client’s worksite, and independent contractors. By 
contrast, standard jobs follow the structure of the traditional employment relationship in the U.S.: 
workers are employees of the firm, and while employment in the U.S. is “at-will,” there is an implicit 
contract of permanent employment. 
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FIGURE 1 
Levels of Analysis for Understanding Domestic Outsourcing 
Changes in the organization 
of production 
 Changes in the organization 
of work 
 Changes in worker outcomes 
across jobs 
Firm level  Job/workplace level  Worker level 
Increased use of: 
Contracting out to other 
firms: 
 both on-site and off-site 
 using subcontractors, 
temp agencies and other 
staffing firms, suppliers 
and vendors 
 
Franchising: treated here as 
a form of contracting out 
 
Independent contractors: 
use of true independent 
contractors (i.e., not 
misclassified) is treated here 
as a form of contracting out 
 Effects on: 
Job quality: wages, benefits, 
hours, workload, schedules, 
health and safety, incidence 
of wage theft, job stability, 
training, access to 
promotions, etc. 
 
The employment 
relationship: 
 permanent or temporary 
 coverage by employment 
and labor laws 
 employer of record 
 collective bargaining 
 
 Effects on: 
Economic security: bundling of 
multiple forms of income-
generating work (e.g., standard 
jobs, on-demand gigs) 
 
Career mobility: ability to 
establish wage growth and 
employment stability over time 
 
 
Source and notes: Authors’ analysis. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, jobs at contractor firms may be standard or nonstandard; the same is true for 
in-house jobs. This point is critical: Contractor firms may be small fly-by-night shops offering spot 
employment or large multinational corporations — such as Aramark or Securitas — offering 
standard employment contracts. As a result, there is nothing inherently contingent or nonstandard 
about jobs at contractor firms, and outsourcing’s impact on the organization of work and job quality 
is not predetermined. We suspect that in some industries, nonstandard jobs may be more prevalent 
at contractor firms, as is the case in call centers (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009), but 
establishing this relationship (and understanding its determinants) is an empirical question. Similarly, 
how other job quality outcomes (such as wages, benefits, hours, schedules, and workplace safety) 
map onto each of the employment relationships in the table is an empirical question. 
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FIGURE 2 
Relationship between Contracting Out and Employment Status 
 In-house jobs Contracted jobs (both on-site and off-site) 
Standard jobs  Permanent employees   Permanent employees  
Nonstandard jobs  On-call  
 Direct-hire temporary 
 
 Independent contractors, including on-
demand platform workers 
 Temp agency workers 
 Leased/professional employer 
organization workers 
Source and notes: Authors’ analysis. 
 
 
Examples of Domestic Outsourcing 
Firms in every sector of the economy contract with other firms as part of their production process, 
as do governmental entities. The functions that are outsourced vary widely, and even a cursory 
sampling shows considerable diversity: human resources and R&D functions, building services, 
recycling, regulation and compliance, accounting, credit card collections, call centers, mortgage and 
check processing, information technology and data processing, logistics and transportation, machine 
maintenance, cable installation, food services and food processing, parts manufacturing and 
assembly, laundry, housekeeping, diagnostic labs and MRI scans, and clinical research trials.  
 
The structure of firm-level contracting relationships is similarly varied. Based on the existing 
research literature, we have identified several different examples, depicted in the figures below. The 
figures illustrate the variety and complexity of contracting structures and are meant to be suggestive, 
not exhaustive. Moreover, existing research does not document the prevalence of any of these 
forms; that is an empirical question for future research. 
 
The archetypal image of firm-to-firm contracting is the linear supply chain. For example, in Figure 
3a, we illustrate the food supply chain in the U.S., showing the classic line of contracting from 
agriculture all the way through to firms that sell food to consumers (which may be contractors 
themselves, as in the case of food services companies). But domestic contracting also includes a 
wide array of business-to-business transactions that are not well captured by the supply chain 
paradigm. In Figure 3b, we illustrate what Barenberg (2015) calls the “hub and spoke” model of 
contracting, where the lead firm (in this case a building owner) contracts with a number of other 
firms for on-site services such as cleaning and security and off-site services such as insurance. Note 
that one could flip this diagram and place a major business services  
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contract firm (such as Compass) at the hub and identify its contracts with a wide range of clients via 
the spokes. Figure 3c illustrates a non-hierarchical production network, featuring continuous 
collaboration between video game publishers, console manufacturers, and software developers and 
designers (Balland, De Vaan, and Boschma 2013). Figure 3d shows the classic pyramidal 
franchising structure that is prevalent in fast food and other industries (Weil 2014). 
 
FIGURE 3 
Various Contracting Patterns 
      
     (a) Supply chain    (b) Hub and spoke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
       (c) Network      (d) Franchising 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source and notes: Modified from Barenberg (2015). 
 
Finally, in Figure 4 we use the hotel industry to illustrate how several different contracting 
structures operate together to deliver a set of final services to the consumer (adapted from 
Barenberg [2015, Figure 7]; see also Weil [2014]). The figure shows the franchising structure of a 
hotel brand, the services contracting of a particular hotel, the logistics contracting chain for 
delivering furniture and linens, and the use of independent contractors in the case of trucking and 
temp staffing firms in the case of warehouses. Note that this diagram could be expanded to include 
many more nodes of contracting, such as the use of staffing firms by the manufacturers or the 
contracting by the security services company with other clients besides the hotel franchise. 
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These descriptive diagrams raise a host of important questions, both about the contracting 
relationships themselves and about their impact on workers. How prevalent is domestic contracting 
and how has it changed over time? What factors are driving it and how does it vary by industry, 
occupation, firm-level strategies, and other organizational characteristics? And how do these 
different models of contracting out affect the organization of work within and across firm 
boundaries and, by extension, the quality of jobs, inequality, and other labor market outcomes? 
 
FIGURE 4 
Combination of Contractual Patterns 
 
 
Source and notes: Modified from Barenberg (2015). 
 
In the next three sections, we review existing theories and empirical research to identify what is 
known about the causes and consequences of outsourcing on labor market outcomes. In the final 
section, we propose a major research initiative designed to significantly strengthen the body of 
knowledge about this important but understudied economic trend. 
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3. Why Do Firms Contract Out, and What 
Explains Variation in Their Strategies? 
 
Central to theories of the firm is why, or under what conditions, they choose to make versus buy 
goods and services. Social science research explained the vertical integration of firms over most of 
the 20th century by arguing that internal production was more efficient than contracting out. Today 
the challenge is to explain an observed shift towards outsourcing.  
 
In this section, we review the recent literature on outsourcing from economics, management 
sciences, industrial relations, and sociology. Overall, we find that most scholars agree that domestic 
outsourcing has increased, albeit for different reasons. While some privilege the role of new 
technologies that facilitate outsourcing, others emphasize the role of heightened global competition 
or the role of deregulation of capital and labor markets that shift the balance of power from labor to 
capital. These changes have affected firms’ make-or-buy calculations. This literature, however, does 
not provide sufficient fine-grained analyses about the factors driving change or why the use of 
outsourcing varies across specific industries, occupations, or business functions, and it largely fails to 
address the implications for workers.  
 
 
Economic and Management Perspectives 
To explain the make or buy decision, economic and management theories have focused primarily on 
the relative costs of internal versus external production. They explain recent changes in terms of 
technological advances that have reduced the relative costs of outsourcing.  
 
Chandler, for example, focuses on relative production costs (Chandler 1977, 1990). He argues that 
advances in transportation and communications technologies at the end of the 19th century led to 
the rise of a mass market and to mass production. Firms achieved higher productivity via 
“economies of throughput” — by processing a large volume of inputs through dedicated, high 
fixed-cost machinery. From this perspective, vertical integration of the supply chain followed 
because firms needed a steady supply of inputs and stable consumer demand. In addition, 
managerial expertise was critical for internal coordination of processes and ongoing improvements 
in productivity, growth, and market share (Helper and Sako 2010, 403ff).  
 Working Paper: Domestic Outsourcing in the U.S.: A Research Agenda to Assess Trends and Effects on Job Quality 12 
 
 
Mass production manufacturing was undermined in the 1980s, according to Chandler and others, by 
the rise of international competition and the availability of new production and management 
technologies. Flexible manufacturing technologies allowed factories to produce a greater variety of 
goods in small batches, enabling decentralized production in flexibly specialized firms (Piore and 
Sabel 1984). Japanese lean production, characterized by lead firms controlling manufacturing 
processes in a complex web of supplier firms (Dore 1986), achieved higher levels of innovation, 
lower time-to-market for new products, and higher quality and productivity than mass production 
models (Jaikumar 1986, MacDuffie 1995). U.S. firms tried to emulate lean production by increasing 
their use of contracting out and reconfiguring their supply chains.  
 
More broadly applicable across service as well as manufacturing industries is the transactions cost 
framework (Coase 1937), which explains the make or buy decision on the basis of relative transaction 
costs. Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that the vertically integrated firm emerged in the 20th century 
because hierarchies are more efficient than markets. Hierarchies minimize the costs of transactions 
between buyers and sellers because we live in a world of bounded rationality (limited ability to 
process information), asset specificity (nonstandard, idiosyncratic capital goods or skills that are 
especially valuable in the relationship), and individual opportunism (self-interested behavior with 
guile). Consequently, by retaining production in-house, firms minimize transaction costs and have 
more mechanisms to control or limit opportunism.  
 
In this framework, supply-side changes that reduce the cost of market transactions relative to 
internal hierarchies explain the recent vertical disintegration of firms. New information and 
communications technologies (ICT) have facilitated outsourcing and the decentralization of 
producing goods and services because ICT lowers the costs of information processing and 
coordination of work across organizational boundaries, thereby reducing the cost advantages of 
internal production. ICT also enhances firms’ capabilities to monitor and enforce contracts with 
external suppliers, thereby reducing the relative advantages of hierarchy. ICT allows firms to achieve 
control over productive activities — the advantages of vertical integration — without assuming the 
risks of actual ownership or the inflexibility of bureaucracy. Blois (1972) refers to this as “vertical 
quasi-integration,” and others as “virtual integration.” 
 
These supply-side arguments are typically combined with demand-side arguments — that reductions 
in product market regulation have heightened cost competition and increased incentives to 
outsource based on cost. These changes include not only trade liberalization in global markets but 
also deregulation since the 1970s in service industries such as airlines, telecommunications, 
transportation, banking, and health care. 
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Academic scholars, however, have not only tried to explain changes in firm behavior, many have 
actively promoted new decentralized organizational models, especially advocates of agency theory and 
core competency theory. Inspired by Milton Friedman’s (1970) argument that profit maximization is 
the sole purpose of the corporation — and reacting to the poor profitability of large conglomerates 
in the 1970s — a generation of agency theorists provided the rationale for breaking up large 
corporations and selling off or outsourcing less-profitable operations.  
 
Large publicly-traded firms, they reasoned, suffer from principal-agent problems because dispersed 
shareholders (the principals) are not able to hold opportunistic managers (the agents) sufficiently 
accountable -- allowing them to make decisions that favor their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). As a result, managers could engage in a 
variety of behaviors that are assumed to interfere with maximizing profits and shareholder value, 
such as building large conglomerates or negotiating better wages and working conditions.  
 
As Weil (2014) and Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) have pointed out, these large companies 
tended to offer jobs with higher wages and employment security due to union contracts (Card, 
Lemieux, and Riddell 2004), internal equity concerns (Weil 2014), or efficiency wage considerations 
that higher wages and better treatment of workers would elicit greater labor productivity (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1990; Rees 1993). In the U.S., where the union-non-union wage gap is large, firms faced 
with increased competition or shareholder pressures have incentives to reduce costs by outsourcing 
work to lower-cost or non-union providers. 
 
Agency theory provides the rationale for eliminating these uses of corporate earnings, including the 
rent sharing of firm profits with workers. In this view, retained earnings should be returned to 
shareholders rather than spent on business expansion or above-market wages. Less-profitable 
operations should be sold off, with returns going to shareholders. Thus, agency theory provided the 
rationale for breaking up corporations — as exemplified by corporate raiders in the 1980s — who 
bought up undervalued companies with poor stock market performance and sold off or closed 
divisions to increase shareholder value. These strategies soon became widespread. 
 
While agency theory provided the overarching argument for maximizing shareholder value, it did 
not translate this theory into specific business strategies. That was taken up by management 
strategists who argued that firms could achieve “competitive advantage,” and hence higher 
profitability for shareholders, by focusing on their “core competency” — that is, what they do best. 
In this view, the diversified conglomerate of the 1960s and 1970s unraveled because it lacked 
sufficient focus and the competence to effectively manage diverse productive activities. Firms, it is 
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argued, should compete by pursuing a single-minded business strategy — for example, as a low-cost 
producer or by providing differentiated products (Porter 1985). Firms become “best in class” by 
focusing resources and talent on their core competencies and eliminating other lines of business 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Firms achieve competitive advantage by capitalizing on their unique 
resources (Penrose 1959) and investing in difficult to imitate human resource (HR) systems that 
enhance human and social capital (Barney 1991). 
 
The core competency argument justifies organizational restructuring at two levels: the business unit 
level and the operational or task level. At the business unit level, firms are admonished to sell off 
those businesses that are not best in class — hence, for example, hiving off entire product divisions 
or business functions. At the operational level, management scientists argue that firms should assess 
the “strategic value-added” of each task in their core business units and outsource lower valued-
added activities as well as ancillary services, such as routine HR administration or customer service 
operations (Lepak and Snell 1999). This line of reasoning justifies a specialized division of labor, 
with more value-added or knowledge-producing activities retained in-house and less-value-added 
activities outsourced.  
 
The knowledge-based view of the firm reaches similar conclusions (Kogut and Zander 1992). Firms 
should keep in-house those tasks or capabilities that are complex and difficult to codify or that the 
firm already has and believes will contribute to innovation or higher economic value. It will 
outsource tasks that are easily codifiable or tasks in which other firms have already developed 
expertise. 
 
Again engineering and management scholars cited advances in technology and the digital revolution 
to explain why the ability to codify and standardize knowledge — and hence outsource it — has 
increased. They have elaborated the design principle of “modularity” — that is, the decomposition 
of complex systems into separable design elements. This enables firms to codify knowledge of a 
production process, identify separable parts, and standardize the interfaces. When done effectively, 
modularity reduces costs, increases the speed of innovation, and increases returns to specialization 
(Ulrich and Eppinger 1995; Fixson 2005). It also reduces the probability of contractor opportunism 
given the ability to standardize and specify product design features (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 
2000). While modularity has focused on goods production, codification of information and 
knowledge applies equally to business functions and service activities such as business process 
outsourcing, law, accounting, banking, and other customer-facing operations. Deblaere and Osborne 
(2010) argue that services have been broken into their components and optimized through 
automation and standardization. This, they contend, has created economies of scale that make 
external provision of inputs more efficient than internal production.  
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The rise of the computer industry and the digital revolution also help explain the rise of a new 
model of business organization — a horizontally specialized structure as opposed to a vertically 
integrated one. Saxenian’s (1996) research demonstrating the superior performance of networked 
firms in Silicon Valley compared to hierarchical firms in the MIT corridor is illustrative, as are 
Powell and colleagues’ (1996) study of the U.S. biotech industry and a number of studies of the ICT 
industry (Fine 1998; Kraemer and Dedrick 2002; Fields 2004). Firms in other industries have tried to 
apply this networked form to their own organizations. 
 
 
Institutional and Political Explanations 
In contrast to the economics and management literatures, other scholars have advanced institutional 
and political explanations for the demise of the vertically integrated firm. From these perspectives, 
U.S. corporations grew and prospered during most of the 20th century based on a managerial 
business model in which experienced managers with industry-specific expertise were the source of 
on-going improvements in firm performance (Chandler 1977). Separation of ownership from 
organizational control ensured that managers could focus on long-term productivity growth rather 
than short-term shareholder profits, and long organizational careers reduced opportunism by tying 
managers’ individual fortunes to firm outcomes (Lazonick 1992).  
 
That model depended on banking and securities laws put in place in the New Deal, as well as on 
labor market regulation and union cooperation. Internal labor market theory argues that large 
employers established internal administrative rules and provided benefits and promotion 
opportunities to secure a loyal workforce and to ensure labor peace; unions negotiated seniority 
clauses and internal job ladders to enhance job and income security (Doeringer and Piore 1971; 
Jacoby 1985). Non-union firms mimicked union rules (Foulkes 1980). 
 
That model began to unravel in the 1960s and 1970s due to a series of institutional changes both 
inside and outside of the firm (Davis 2009). Internally, U.S. corporations increasingly focused on 
growth through mergers and acquisitions, giving rise to diversified conglomerates. Under this 
“portfolio model of the corporation,” the frequent buying and selling of businesses created a new 
norm of viewing companies as bundles of assets to be bought and sold (Hayes and Abernathy 1980). 
Decision-making power shifted from line managers with production expertise to chief financial 
officers, who bought and sold units based on their profitability (Fligstein 1990; Lazonick 1992; Zorn 
2004).  
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This concept of the firm as akin to Lego pieces that can be assembled and reassembled based on 
short-term profit goals has received growing attention. Some scholars particularly emphasize the 
deregulation of capital markets and labor markets from the 1970s on to explain the vertical 
disintegration of the firm and the growth of outsourcing (Appelbaum and Batt 2014). In this line of 
reasoning, financial market deregulation gave investors and stockholders more power to pressure 
firms to maximize shareholder value, and the lax enforcement of labor laws and the decline of union 
power freed them from prior constraints to do so.  
 
The shift in the relative power of capital and labor encouraged firms to maximize profits in part by 
selling off business units or outsourcing less-profitable parts of the value chain. Firms exited low-
margin activities and retained those with high margins to increase earnings that could be returned to 
shareholders via higher dividends or stock buybacks, which increased share price (Lazonick 2014). 
CEOs would implement these strategies because their own pay was increasingly tied to stock market 
performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Stock option pay represented 20 percent of CEO 
compensation in 1980 but 50 percent in 1994 (Hall and Liebman 1998).  
 
Capital market deregulation occurred through a series of legislative changes. The power of 
institutional investors to influence corporate behavior increased with passage of the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Acts (ERISA) of 1974 and 1978, which allowed pension funds and 
insurance companies to invest in stock and high risk bonds for the first time (Useem 1996; Gompers 
and Metrick 2001; Zorn et al. 2005: 274). Some argue that the rise of institutional shareholders in the 
1980s was critical in shifting the balance of power from corporate stakeholders (managers and 
workers) to shareholders (Donaldson 1994).  
 
Similarly, in the 1980s, relaxed enforcement of antitrust and securities laws and the elimination of 
state antitakeover laws (Jarrell 1983) gave corporate raiders greater leeway to engage in hostile 
takeovers and sell unprofitable businesses or increase outsourcing to improve profit margins. To 
hedge against hostile takeovers, corporations themselves started engaging in these strategies 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001: 132-4).  
 
Further deregulation of banking since the 1990s facilitated the growth of financial intermediaries 
such as private equity firms that engage in leveraged buyouts and activist hedge funds that are able 
to overthrow CEOs or force changes in business strategies based on ownership of a relatively small 
percent of a company’s stock. These actors often insist on the sell-off of assets, divestment of less-
profitable establishments, and greater use of outsourcing (Appelbaum and Batt 2014; Brav, Jiang, 
and Kim 2015). 
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Labor market deregulation occurred as global labor markets expanded (Freeman 2005) and as U.S. 
labor laws went unenforced. The decline in union density and power allowed firms to outsource 
work either to rid themselves of expensive and time-consuming union contracts or to prevent 
unions from organizing new units. De-unionization in manufacturing also diminished those unions’ 
resources for organizing new unions in emerging sectors within the U.S.  
 
Similarly, deregulation of service industries with traditionally high union density also contributed to 
de-unionization, the intensification of competition from non-union competitors, and the ability of 
firms to shift work to contractors. Examples of this pattern have been documented in trucking 
(Belzer 1994; Milkman 2008), construction and building services (Milkman 2006), and call centers 
(Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009: 458ff). Organizing campaigns in service industries have yielded 
single-digit union density in almost all cases. Union administrative failure (Piore 1989) and inter-
union conflicts have also led to the decline in union power. Beyond voiding or minimizing the 
power of unions, companies may use outsourcing to avoid accountability for other U.S. labor and 
employment laws, including wage and hour, prevailing wage, workers’ compensation, health and 
safety, pension, and anti-discrimination statutes (Weil 2014).  
 
In sum, academic theory and research points to an array of explanations for the vertical 
disintegration of firms across a wide range of industries, as well as why new forms of business 
organization based on interfirm networks are emerging and becoming institutionalized. While much 
of the research and theorizing has focused on globalization and the rise of global supply chains, 
none of the theories identified here are specific to that international process. Rather, they attribute 
outsourcing to heightened competitive pressures — whether in traded or nontraded goods — and to 
technological, organizational, regulatory, and political changes that affect how firms decide where to 
produce goods and services.  
 
 
What Explains Variation in Outsourcing?  
While there is a growing consensus that more networked forms of business organization have 
emerged, academic research offers few insights into why the prevalence and forms of outsourcing 
vary across different industries, firms, or productive activities. Below we identify a few approaches 
that provide a starting point for thinking about how and why firms vary in their approaches to 
outsourcing. 
 
Two frameworks take an economic or functionalist approach, arguing that variation in how firms 
use outsourcing depends on the product market in which they compete and their organizational 
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capabilities. One framework identifies three functions of outsourcing (Holmes 1986). First, if firms 
operate in markets with high or uncertain demand fluctuation, they may outsource overflow work 
(capacity contracting) to meet increases in demand without investing in expensive equipment that 
may lie idle during economic downturns. Second, if the production of particular products requires 
specialized inputs, they may take advantage of contractors who have particular expertise or 
sophisticated technology (specialization subcontracting). Third, firms may choose, for a variety of 
reasons that are not clearly understood, to turn over large parts of the production process to an 
independent supplier (supplier subcontracting). Each of these strategies shifts risks to contractors 
and has the potential to both improve revenues for the firm (via higher quantity or quality of 
production) and reduce costs (due to contractor efficiency, absorption of risk, investments in 
technology, or payment of lower wages in non-union settings). In this framework, variation in 
outsourcing depends on the particular characteristics of goods or services produced and differences 
in the competitive conditions of markets. Hypercompetitive and volatile markets or industries 
characterized by rapid innovation are more likely to use all three types of contracting. 
 
A second framework for why firms vary in their use of outsourcing is based on specific product 
characteristics (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). This framework integrates insights from 
transaction costs economics, production networks, and dynamic capabilities (organizational learning) 
to create a typology of five different types of networks — market, modular (turnkey), relational, 
captive, and integrated. Gereffi and colleagues argue that variation depends on three factors: the 
complexity of information and knowledge to be transferred across firm boundaries, the extent to 
which this information and knowledge can be codified and transferred, and the capabilities of 
contracting firms and individuals.  
 
Variation also arises because industries and firms differ in the point at which they begin to outsource 
parts of production and how much they learn over time. Research on organizational learning and 
dynamic capabilities shows that firms may produce the same good with different production costs 
(Teece 1988; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997; Kogut and Zander 1992), and as new technologies or 
capabilities change, firms’ make or buy decisions can change as well (Langlois 1992). As suppliers 
learn over time, they can increase the scale and scope of what they do, develop greater 
sophistication, and take on increasingly complex processes or bundled services. As primary firms 
become more confident of the quality and reliability of their services, the use of suppliers is likely to 
become permanent or institutionalized (Sturgeon 2002; Saxenian 2005). Gereffi and colleagues argue 
more generally that this learning process is likely to lead to a permanent shift away from hierarchical 
and captive forms towards relational, modular, and market forms. 
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Other management scholars and sociologists argue that variation in supplier networks is shaped by 
the level of trust between partners. The repeated interactions of people in interfirm networks over 
time should create norms of trust that reduce the likelihood of individual opportunism (Powell 1990; 
Uzzi 1996). Higher trust leads to better performance outcomes (MacDuffie and Helper 2006), 
suggesting also that networked firms should become stable or institutionalized over time. The 
argument that trust matters in relational contracting contrasts sharply with modularity arguments in 
which trust is not essential (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 2000; Sturgeon 2002).  
 
The structure of governance may also help explain variation in interfirm networks and outcomes 
among contracting parties (Bair 2009). By governance we mean the set of rules and practices that 
establish the balance of power and control among the lead and contractor firms. This includes not 
only contractual obligations between the parties as set forth in legal agreements, but also the ways in 
which the various actors in the contracting network exert control over other participants. An 
analysis of who holds the power of decision-making and monitoring and enforcement of rules 
should help explain how value is created, appropriated, and distributed among actors in the 
production network. Variation in the governance structure, then, should also have important 
implications for the quality of jobs for workers, depending on where in the production network they 
are employed. 
 
Industrial relations scholars also emphasize the importance of relationships of power to explain 
variation in contracting — whether, for example, regulations or unions constrain managerial choice 
of business strategy. Variation in labor institutions, regulations, and union power shape firm 
strategies for achieving labor flexibility, the extent of use of contingent or temporary workers, and 
the use of outsourcing (Houseman and Osawa 2003; Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi 
2016). Where unions have sufficient bargaining power, they are able to limit outsourcing and 
negotiate the terms and conditions of its use (Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi 2016). 
Where unions have weak bargaining power, by contrast, firms may actually outsource more in order 
to rid themselves of union contractual requirements and costs, as in the case of Delphi Automotive 
Corporation, where 30,000 union jobs were offshored when private equity owners took control 
(Appelbaum and Batt 2014). Thus, union presence and power provide one explanation for why 
firms that compete in the same markets may nonetheless have different approaches to the use of 
outsourcing.  
 
In sum, existing research points to several factors that have driven the overall growth in outsourcing, 
the break-up of vertically integrated firms, and the rise of new networked forms of production. 
Technological advances and management innovations have reduced the monitoring and 
coordination costs of arms-length transactions. New economic and management theories have 
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promoted the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests to focus on profit maximization, 
leading firms to focus on high-value-added core activities and to sell off or outsource lower-value-
added processes. And the growth of competitive pressures on firms has threatened margins and 
provided greater incentives to cut costs, in part via outsourcing. At the same time, specific research 
is thin regarding variation in the extent of outsourcing and the form it takes across industries, firms, 
and different productive activities. These questions are at the cutting edge of new research on 
outsourcing and will require consideration of a variety of economic, political, and legal factors. 
 
 
4. The Impact of Domestic Outsourcing on the 
Quality of Jobs 
 
Empirical research on the effect of outsourcing on the quality of jobs is limited. In the literature 
reviewed in Section 3, the outcomes of interest are organizational performance, competitiveness, or 
firm survival. Clearly, however, changes in the organization of production at the firm level will spill 
over into changes in the organization of work, with implications for HR management and job 
quality (Rubery, Earnshaw, and Marchington 2005). 
 
Theories about why firms choose to outsource do, however, offer implicit predictions for what is 
likely to happen to the quality of jobs, including pay, benefits, and working conditions such as health 
and safety. Most suggest that job quality will be lower in outsourced operations, although there is 
reason to expect variation as well. This section presents some working hypotheses about how 
outsourcing affects the quality of jobs and inequality, the causal mechanisms at work, and the scant 
empirical evidence on these questions. 
 
The economic and management literatures — including transactions costs, core competency, 
resource-based theories, and global value chain literatures — suggest that firms will retain in-house 
more complex jobs and outsource those involving lower-value-added tasks with routine to mid-
range skill requirements. Tasks that are complex and require firm-specific skills will be retained in-
house, in this view, because of the challenge of monitoring and enforcing contracts. The more 
granular arguments in the modularity literature clarify that these tasks are not amenable to 
codification and standardization, and hence not easily outsourced without sacrificing cost and 
quality. The resource-based view argues that higher-value-added tasks associated with core 
competencies must be retained in-house to preserve the firm’s source of competitive advantage, and 
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the knowledge-based view argues that these unique resources are the firm’s lifeline to innovation and 
sustainability. 
 
In these scenarios, outsourcing changes the rules for determining wages for low-skilled workers, 
from internal administrative rules in large firms to market-based pricing across firms. Internal equity 
norms or efficiency wage considerations lead large primary firms to compress the wage structure. 
When low-skilled tasks are outsourced, internal equity norms are broken and workers in those jobs 
receive pay that more closely reflects the market wage for the specific tasks they do. Workers are 
sorted into higher-paying jobs in primary firms and lower-paying jobs in contractor firms according 
to differences in skill levels. Contractors supplying low-valued-added or routine services also face 
tougher competitive conditions as barriers to entry are low and price-based competitive bidding is 
common. 
 
Recent empirical studies provide some evidence that this process of outsourcing lower-skilled jobs 
results in substantial pay and benefit penalties in janitorial and guard services (Dube and Kaplan 
2010). Similarly, in their study of logistics, cleaning, security, and food services functions using 
German administrative data, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) document the dramatic rise in 
outsourcing of these functions and the substantial decline in wages relative to similar jobs that were 
not outsourced, contributing to the rise in German wage inequality since the 1980s. These studies 
attribute the lower wages for contractors to the loss of firm-specific rents and to primary firm 
strategies to lower labor costs. 
 
Batt and colleagues examine the impact of outsourcing on call center jobs based on establishment-
level survey research (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009). Regression analyses show systematic 
differences between union, non-union in-house, and outsourced operations, with the latter scoring 
the lowest on virtually all dimensions of job quality, including substantially lower pay, benefits, and 
discretion at work; they also show greater use of electronic monitoring and part-time and contingent 
work (Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 2006; Batt and Nohara 2009). Doellgast and colleagues (2016) find 
similar wage penalties in studies of call center outsourcing in Europe. 
 
Weil (2014) argues that the quality of jobs and wages are likely to be worse in outsourced operations 
because small contractors are more likely to violate labor and employment laws. Typically they are 
less knowledgeable about what the law requires, have unsophisticated (or no) human resources 
function, and have greater incentives to violate the law because their profit margins are thinner. 
Small firms may also bargain contracts with lead firms that set unrealistic performance requirements. 
Ji and Weil (2015), for example, find that non-compliance with minimum wage and overtime 
regulations are much higher in franchisee than in company-operated outlets and attribute this to 
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differences in the profit models of the two entities. Whereas franchisors earn their money through a 
royalty fee based on revenue volume, franchisees depend on profit margins and have greater 
incentives to squeeze labor costs.  
 
Available evidence indicates that contracting out also is associated with a higher incidence of 
workplace injuries. For example, U.S. research has found much higher injury rates among contract 
workers in petroleum (Rebitzer 1995), mining (Muzaffar et al. 2013), and among staffing agency 
workers in a variety of occupations (Morris 1999; Foley et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2010). Particularly in 
triangulated employment relationships, responsibility for safety training may be unclear and fall 
through the cracks. In addition, employers with unsafe workplaces may turn to independent 
contractors or contract companies for staffing in order to shed legal liabilities and high workers’ 
compensation insurance costs, which are experience rated.4  
 
Finally, reputational effects, even for large contractors, may be less important for franchisees or 
subcontractors than for primary firms that compete on their brand. And the lax enforcement of 
labor and employment laws in the 2000s created a permissive context for contractors to evade or 
violate labor regulation (Bernhardt, McGrath, and DeFilippis 2007; Bernhardt et al. 2008).  
 
The question of whether these arguments also apply to outsourcing of higher skilled or “core” 
workers has not been tested. Weil argues that the downward pressures on wages and working 
conditions in outsourced operations should apply more generally, based on the assumption that the 
lead firm has asymmetric power relative to suppliers or contractors. This allows the lead firm to set 
the terms and conditions in contractual agreements and create a highly competitive bidding process 
that puts downward pressure on profit margins and, in turn, wages (Weil 2014: 15, 100). Compared 
to primary firms, small contractor firms also face higher costs of capital and have less control over 
contract duration or renewal; this contractual uncertainty may translate into greater job insecurity for 
workers and greater use of contingent labor by contractor firms. These arguments, it should be 
noted, do not take into account cases where contractor firms may be in a strong bargaining position 
due to their large size and the range of services they provide or because they supply specialized 
expertise or technology.  
 
Where large lead firms dictate terms and conditions to smaller contractor firms, domestic 
outsourcing can lead to greater inequality in two ways. First, if it sorts higher-skilled and lower-
skilled workers into (large) primary and (small) contractor firms, then inequality between different 
skill or occupational groups is accentuated because lower-skilled workers are removed from the 
                                                 
4  See Boden, Spieler, and Wagner (2016) for an expanded discussion of the issues and empirical evidence on contracting out and 
workplace health and safety.  
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internal wage structures of large firms. The resource-based view of the firm hints that inequality 
between in-house and outsourced jobs may be even greater than one would expect based on core 
competency and human capital arguments alone. In effect, the “human resources” retained in-house 
are quasi-fixed or valuable assets that require on-going investment. Core workers in primary firms 
benefit not only from higher pay but also training and participation in “high involvement work 
systems” that offer more opportunity (Appelbaum et al. 2000). By contrast, routine labor in 
outsourced firms will be viewed as a variable cost to be minimized and is unlikely to receive training 
investments. If outsourcing distributes workers with the same skills and abilities into primary (large) 
and contractor (small) firms, then it is also likely to increase within-group inequality by removing 
workers from internal labor markets in large firms (Cappelli 1999; Bernhardt, Dresser, and Hatton 
2003). 
 
Findings from several recent studies suggest a general relationship between increased domestic 
outsourcing and rising inequality, but do not provide enough detail to sort out the causal 
mechanisms. Davis and Cobb (2010) find that inequality is inversely related to the proportion of 
workers in the largest firms. A recent study using the Longitudinal Business Dynamics data base and 
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data (LEHD) finds that much of the growth in earnings 
inequality in the United States since the 1970s is accounted for by increased dispersion in earnings 
across establishments (Barth et al. 2014). Similarly, Handwerker and Spletzer (2015) and 
Handwerker (2015) use data from the Occupational Employment Statistics program to show that 
growth in the occupational concentration of workers in establishments accounts for a large share of 
the growth in wage inequality.  
 
In sum, these literatures provide economic, strategic, and political explanations for the existence of 
lower-quality jobs in outsourced operations as well as for increased inequality. Existing empirical 
findings are consistent with this argument for low-wage workers, but only a small number of 
empirical studies have been carried out, and much more research is needed. 
 
 
Variation in Outsourcing and the Quality of Jobs 
Other lines of research question the association between outsourcing and low job quality. The 
literature on “strategic” or managerial choice has demonstrated that firms may compete successfully 
in the same market on the basis of radically different business and production strategies (Cappelli 
1999; Berger 2005). Typologies of different types of contracting relations (Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon 2005) suggest that the labor conditions that result from each approach may be different. 
And a recent paper (Lakhani, Kuruvilla, and Avgar 2013) presents a straightforward linear mapping 
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between contractor types and employment systems, with a market-based model (relying largely on 
contracting out) offering the lowest levels of skills and job stability and the hierarchical model (with 
internal labor markets) offering the highest. No empirical tests of this framework exist, although 
case studies of U.S. multinational firms show that closer and longer-term relations with offshore 
suppliers tend to produce fewer labor violations (Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007; Locke 2013). These 
types of studies are suggestive, but they provide little guidance regarding the impact of outsourcing 
in the United States on the quality of jobs and inequality. 
 
The literature on trust and collaboration in supply chains similarly carries an implicit prediction that 
variation in contracting relations along these dimensions should lead to variation in employment 
systems. Some research has shown that trust and collaboration are key to sustainability and high 
performance in supply chains (Dyer and Chu 2000; MacDuffie 2011); and arguably, greater stability 
among contractors may well benefit workers via enhanced employee training, autonomy, and 
employment stability. But no empirical research has tackled this question.  
 
Research on organizational learning or dynamic capabilities also suggests that working conditions 
will vary in contractor firms, in this case based on their experience and development over time. As 
suppliers grow and become more sophisticated, the organizational capabilities in the supply chain 
can be redistributed (Jacobides 2005; Jacobides and Winter 2005; Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 
2005). As contractors take on more high-value-added tasks, the human capital requirements of jobs 
should increase and, in turn, lead to higher pay for workers. But again, these ideas are untested. 
 
The specific terms of contractual agreements also matter. Lead firms set forth explicit and detailed 
specifications in legal agreements with their contractors, and these requirements and the incentive 
structures they create vary substantially across different types of contract or franchising agreements 
(Weil 2014: 63-79). Any theory of the impact of domestic contracting on the quality of jobs should 
examine the terms and conditions of vendor contracts; the relative asymmetry between the primary 
and contractor firms; the mechanisms for monitoring, enforcement, renewal, or termination of 
contracts; the duration and certainty of contract renewal; and the business model of contractors.  
 
Finally, some studies show that the jobs and conditions for managerial and professional employees 
may improve when they move to specialized contractors. Dieticians and food service managers, for 
example, generally have better job promotion opportunities if they work for a contract food service 
company than if they are the direct-hire employee of an individual hospital, school, or other 
establishment with a cafeteria (Erickcek, Houseman, and Kalleberg 2003). By contrast, research on 
the unbundling of corporate functions (law, accounting, HR functions, shared services) provides no 
clear evidence regarding the quality of jobs in outsourced high-skilled occupations (Sako, 
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Chondrakis, and Vaaler 2013). Where access to specialized services is the driving force in interfirm 
contracting, human capital theory suggests that pay and working conditions should depend on the 
degree of specialization in each node of the network.  
 
In sum, the preponderance of theory predicts that workers in outsourced operations will experience 
lower wages and job quality, and a handful of empirical studies support this claim, but only for low-
wage workers. But the causal mechanisms remain unclear or unspecified. More broadly, there is a 
clear need for systematic empirical research that identifies a wider range of outsourcing models and 
documents the relationship between the type of outsourcing and the quality of jobs and inequality, 
specifies the causal mechanisms in this relationship, and identifies the institutional conditions under 
which these relationships hold. 
 
 
5. The State of Data on the Prevalence of and 
Growth in Domestic Outsourcing 
 
Most available data point to significant growth in domestic outsourcing in recent years. 
Nevertheless, there are substantial gaps and, likely, biases in these data. In this section, we review 
available evidence of the prevalence of and growth in domestic outsourcing, discuss the limitations 
of existing data, and argue for the urgent need for better information.  
 
 
Evidence on Prevalence and Growth  
 
Evidence from government establishment data 
One way to get a sense of the scope of the growth in domestic contracting out is to examine 
employment growth in industries that primarily contract services to businesses. The relative 
employment growth of professional and business services is especially notable because other 
businesses are the principal consumers of these services, and consequently employment trends in 
this sector are often used as a key indicator of outsourcing growth.5 The share of payroll 
employment in professional and business services has nearly doubled from 7.3 to 13.9 percent since 
1970. Within professional and business services, about half of the growth was accounted for by 
industries primarily employing workers in professional occupations (e.g., computer systems and 
                                                 
5  Data on payroll employment come from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program, a monthly establishment survey 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
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management and technical consulting) and about half in industries primarily employing workers in 
nonprofessional occupations (e.g., security services, services to buildings and dwellings, and 
temporary help and other staffing services).  
 
While employment growth in professional and business services provides a useful indicator of the 
growth of domestic outsourcing in the U.S., it is crude. Consumers account for some of the higher 
demand for professional and business services, such as legal services. Moreover, contract workers 
are employed in all sectors, and consequently a focus only on the professional and business services 
sector will miss important developments occurring in other segments of the economy.6  
 
Input-output data developed by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), in contrast, provide a 
natural tool to comprehensively examine growth in domestic outsourcing. Input-output (I-O) tables 
show the dollar value of the intermediate inputs one industry uses from itself and from others, and 
any increase in outsourcing should appear as an increase in the use of intermediate inputs by the 
outsourcing industry.7 By linking the industry providing the contract services with the user industry, 
input-output data show not only trends in outsourcing but also variations across industries in 
outsourcing patterns.8 In addition, I-O data, in combination with employment data in the contract 
industry, permit estimation of the number of workers affected by outsourcing.  
 
Several studies have relied on I-O data to document the growth of domestic outsourcing in the U.S. 
Using data on the input-output structure of the economy, Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros 
(2008) report that the share of GDP accounted for by domestic providers of outsourcing services—
which they defined as purchased services excluding telecommunications and financial services—rose 
from 7 percent to 12 percent between 1982 and 2006. Similarly, Berlingieri (2014) uses input-output 
data for the U.S. economy to examine the extent to which the shift in U.S. employment from 
manufacturing to services is the result of outsourcing. Controlling for changes over time in demand 
for manufactured products and services, he concludes that a substantial share of the increase in 
services employment and the decline in manufacturing employment is the consequence of 
outsourcing. Services previously housed in manufacturing firms have been outsourced to service 
firms, highlighting the importance of outsourcing to professional and business services as noted 
                                                 
6  For example, food services contractors and airport and airline contractors are not classified in the professional and business 
services sector, but instead are identified with their own codes under food services and support activities for transportation, 
respectively. In other cases, contractors are not identified by distinct codes and are grouped with other establishments in a given 
industry (e.g., in mining and telecommunications, see Weil [2014]). In these cases, subcontracting will show up as own-industry 
inputs in the I-O data – i.e., inputs purchased by firms classified in the same industry. The increased share of employment in 
professional and business services also could reflect other compositional changes, such as an increase in the relative size of 
industries that outsource, and do not solely reflect changing staffing practices within industries. 
7  Dollar values in the annual I-O tables may be deflated by the appropriate price indexes to yield real growth in outsourcing.  
8  I-O data can show differences in outsourcing across industries but not across firms within industries. In Section 6 we propose 
industry studies that, among other things, will help us understand variation in outsourcing practices among firms.  
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above. Other evidence supports this conclusion. Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2012) estimate that 
by 2006, staffing services (primarily temporary agencies) added close to 10 percent to employment in 
manufacturing establishments, compared to just 2 percent in 1989. Currently about half of the 
workers needed for the production of manufactured goods are employed outside the manufacturing 
sector (Timmer, Los, and de Vries 2015; Houseman 2014).  
 
Evidence from government household surveys 
While statistics on industry employment and input-output tables are derived from business surveys, 
government household surveys provide some additional evidence of the magnitude of the contract 
workforce. Most notably, the Supplement on Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements 
(CWS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which was conducted five times between 1995 and 
2005, asks individuals about their status as temporary help workers, independent contractors 
(including independent contractors and freelance workers), or contract company workers. With 
respect to the last category, the survey focuses only on individuals who work for a company that 
primarily contracts their services to one organization and who work at that client’s worksite. This is 
a subset of contract company workers, many of whom work off-site or at multiple client sites. One 
valuable feature of the CWS is that it surveyed contract and temporary agency workers on the 
industry of the client firm, and so constitutes the only source in federal statistics on where these 
types of workers perform services. 
 
In the 2005 survey, 7.4 percent of workers identified themselves as independent contractors, 
independent consultants, or freelance workers. Another 0.9 percent and 0.6 percent indicated that 
they worked, respectively, for temporary help agencies and other companies that contracted out 
their services to one client (BLS 2005). The estimated share of the workforce in temporary help 
agencies from the CWS, however, is roughly half the estimated share as measured from the BLS 
establishment, which, as we discuss below, raises questions about the accuracy of estimates from the 
CWS.  
 
In 2015, the Rand American Life Panel Survey included many of the same questions asked on the 
CWS (last conducted in 2005), along with questions on workers’ use of online platforms (Krueger 
2016). This new survey evidence suggests significant growth over the last decade in various types of 
nonstandard employment arrangements, particularly in on-site contract workers. The share of 
respondents identifying themselves as contract workers who work at the client’s worksite jumped by 
more than fivefold from 0.6 percent in the 2005 CWS to 3.1 percent in the 2015 American Life 
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Panel Survey.9 The share participating in on-line “gig” work is small, accounting for only 0.5 percent 
of employment, according to the survey estimates.  
 
Evidence from employer surveys, industry research, and case studies  
Drawing on a combination of government data, private surveys, and other proprietary sources of 
information, researchers and analysts have been able to generate industry- or function-specific 
estimates of the prevalence of (and sometimes trends in) domestic outsourcing. In addition, case 
studies have provided detailed descriptions of the evolution of supply chains.  
 
Academic researchers have conducted a number of employer surveys that, dating back to the late 
1980s, have pointed to the high incidence of and growth in domestic outsourcing (e.g., Abraham 
1990; Houseman 2001; Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden 2003; Nielson and Sturgeon 2014). For 
example, using information from the 2010 National Organizations Survey, which included questions 
on private sector business use of contractors for various functions, Nielsen and Sturgeon (2014) 
summarize the percent of businesses using domestic contractors for facilities management (34 
percent), IT systems (34 percent), transportation services (30 percent), sales and marketing (22 
percent), R&D (20 percent), management, administration and back-office functions (14 percent), 
and customer service (12 percent). A 2003 establishment-level survey of U.S. call centers estimated 
that almost 15 percent of centers at the time were outsourced operations, but because they were 
larger in size they employed almost 50 percent of call center workers (Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 
2006: 336; additional Batt calculations of original data). 
 
Information routinely collected by consulting firms and industry trade groups on outsourcing offers 
provides another source of nongovernmental data. Multiple surveys conducted by national 
consulting firms have found that a majority of firms contract out at least some of their HR 
functions, including payroll and benefits administration, background checks, training, and 
recruitment (Greer, Youngblood, and Gray 1999). IT services constitute an important share of 
services outsourcing, including data centers, help desk services, and training (Sharpe 2001). Industry-
specific surveys show substantial rates of contracting out for a wide range of functions across many 
industries. One summary of proprietary data on insurance companies found high rates of 
contracting out for a diverse set of services (Greenwald 1999). Almost 90 percent of survey 
respondents reported that at least some use contractors for employee benefits administration. For 
other services, the comparable figures were 85 percent for legal services, 81 percent for cafeteria 
services, 77 percent for janitorial and housekeeping, 61 percent for security, 58 percent for payroll 
                                                 
9  Although the survey results are intended to be comparable to those from the CWS, the American Life Panel’s use of an on-line 
survey format and possibly other methodological differences could account for some of the apparent growth in contract and 
other nonstandard employment arrangements.  
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processing, and 47 percent for loss control. Similar surveys exist for air transportation, banking, 
communications, construction, health care, hospitality, manufacturing, mining, pharmaceuticals, and 
retail, among others (Bernhardt and Garrick 2013). Although the quality and representativeness of 
specific data from consulting firms and industry trade groups are often hard to assess, the evidence 
from these sources consistently points to a high incidence of contracting out of many business 
functions. 
 
Researchers have also conducted industry case studies that yield detailed descriptions of the 
evolution of supply chains. The critically important logistics sector is a case in point. Deregulation of 
freight transportation in the 1980s, developments in information technology in the 1990s, and 
growth of complex global supply chains have resulted in significant growth of outsourcing in 
logistics (Bonacich and Wilson 2008). Examples include the shift to independent contractor drivers 
in trucking and the growth of delivery services such as FedEx based on that model; the contracting 
out of warehouses; and the rise of third-party logistics (3PL) companies to which businesses 
outsource the management, transportation, and storage of goods and information in their supply 
chains. Studies have described the dramatic rise during the 1990s and 2000s in U.S. manufacturers’ 
outsourcing of transportation and warehousing, once core functions of manufacturing firms (Baker 
and Hubbard 2003; Lieb and Bentz 2005; Belzer 2002; Armbruster 2003). Use of 3PLs is common 
in all sectors, however, including retail, hospitality, food and beverage, construction, and energy 
(Langley and Capgemini Consulting 2015). Large companies commonly use multiple 3PLs and hire a 
firm to manage its outsourced logistics functions (so-called fourth-party logistics companies, or 
4PLs). Recent survey evidence suggests that logistics outsourcing accounts for about half of business 
spending on transportation and close to 40 percent of spending on warehouse activities (Leuschner 
et al. 2014). Third- and fourth-party logistics companies are classified in various industries, including 
warehousing, transportation, and wholesale trade, making it difficult to observe trends in logistics 
contracting from published government statistics.10  
 
 
Data Limitations  
While case studies have provided important insights into the growth of contracting out in various 
sectors, the information is inherently fragmented and of varying quality. In theory, surveys 
conducted by the U.S. statistical agencies should provide more systematic time-series data for 
                                                 
10  Other research has documented the growth in outsourcing of janitorial and security functions (Dube and Kaplan 2010), food 
services (Lane et al. 2003), and call centers (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009; Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 2006).  
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understanding the extent of outsourcing, its growth, and implications for workers and public policy. 
But official statistics have substantial limitations.  
 
BEA input-output data are useful for showing broad trends in domestic outsourcing in the national 
economy and for identifying which industries that provide intermediate goods and services are 
expanding. They are less useful, however, for identifying the user industries of specific intermediates 
because the data on which the I-O tables depend are often dated and suffer from significant gaps. 
Although annual industry surveys conducted by the census are used to update the I-O tables, the 
most detailed information for estimating the I-O structure of the economy comes from the 
Economic Census, conducted every five years. BEA uses information from the Economic Census 
and other sources to revise the I-O tables (and other national accounts), and it typically takes 5 or 
more years to integrate the latest Economic Census data into the accounts. Thus, at any point in 
time, much of the information used to estimate the I-O structure of the economy is 5 to 10 years 
old.  
 
More important, while the Economic Census collects detailed information on material input 
purchases, information in the Economic Census and annual census surveys on purchased services is 
generally collected for highly aggregated categories. For example, census surveys ask companies to 
report expenditures on all professional and technical services. In addition, the data reported 
combine expenditures on domestic and imported goods and services.11 In sum, published estimates 
of industry input use are often derived from limited information, and researchers should use them 
with caution.12  
 
Workers in contract arrangements are employees of the company contracting their services or are 
self-employed as independent contractors. Household and establishment surveys conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) do not systematically provide information on the characteristics of 
workers in various contract arrangements or the organizations using the contract services (see 
Bernhardt 2014). The Supplement on Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements to the 
CPS was designed to help fill this information gap. Concerns have been raised, however, about the 
ability of individuals (or family members answering on their behalf) to properly identify themselves 
as employed in a contingent or alternative work arrangement. As noted, the share of workers 
reporting themselves as employed by temporary help agencies in the CWS is considerably lower than 
                                                 
11  To estimate imported and domestic intermediate goods and services separately, BEA makes the assumption that each industry 
uses imported inputs in proportion to its overall use of the input in the economy.  
12  In recent years, the Census Bureau has collected information on companies’ expenditures on temporary help and professional 
employer organizations and has added questions to various surveys about whether companies use or provide contract 
manufacturing services. While the collection of such detailed data is currently piecemeal, it represents an important step toward 
improving data on outsourcing and will provide a more complete picture of the incidence across industries of certain types of 
contract arrangements.  
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the share derived from the establishment survey (CES), fueling concerns about the quality of data on 
workers in alternative arrangements. The most recent CWS survey was conducted in 2005, and 
budget problems stalled efforts to replicate it. The 2016 announcement that it will be conducted 
again in May 2017 is a welcome development. The narrow coverage of contract workers and 
concerns about data quality in earlier rounds of the CWS have limited its usefulness for 
understanding the scope of domestic contracting out and its implications for workers. Researchers 
have begun providing input to BLS and the Census Bureau that may improve the usefulness of the 
new data to be collected in 2017 and that may involve supplementing information collected in the 
CWS with new information from establishment surveys.  
 
In sum, available information points to rapid growth in domestic outsourcing in a wide range of 
industries since the 1980s. Yet, data gaps limit our ability to understand the magnitude of the 
phenomenon and its impact on job quality, and to fashion appropriate policy responses. In the next 
section we lay out a major initiative on domestic outsourcing, detailing the questions it should 
answer and providing a menu of research methodologies and potential data sources. 
 
 
6. A Proposed Research Agenda and Research 
Network on Domestic Outsourcing 
 
In what follows, we propose a comprehensive agenda to deepen our understanding of domestic 
outsourcing and the development of a network of researchers to study this important phenomenon. 
We first lay out three central questions to advance our knowledge of how and why domestic 
contracting has expanded and its effects on jobs, wages, and inequality. Then we propose that 
research proceed on two parallel tracks that will inform one another. One track is to conduct in-
depth industry studies; the second is to develop systematic measures of domestic outsourcing in 
government data, which will be necessary to understand the scope and implications of domestic 
contracting economy-wide.  
 
 
Research Questions 
We suggest that three broad questions should drive future research on domestic outsourcing. While 
no single study will be able to address all of these questions, they provide a conceptual roadmap for 
the knowledge base that needs to be created.  
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1. How common is domestic outsourcing, has it grown over time, and how many workers are 
affected?  
a. At the firm (or establishment) level, what is the prevalence of outsourcing, and has it grown 
over time? Possible measures include percent of firms that contract for particular functions, 
and firms’ purchases of goods and services from other firms (or independent contractors) as 
a share of economic output.  
b. How many workers are employed by contractors, has that number grown over time, and do 
the workers differ in demographics from their in-house counterparts?  
c. In which industries are contract workers employed? How have jobs been reallocated across 
sectors over time as a result of domestic outsourcing? 
 
2. What are the drivers of domestic outsourcing in particular industries or production networks, 
and what are the different forms it takes?  
a. What are the economic, political, and public policy forces that have shaped the prevalence of 
domestic outsourcing over time, and which functions are contracted out? Of particular 
interest is the impact of financialization as well as institutional factors (e.g., labor market and 
product market regulation, unions and social movements, consumer demands, and political 
pressures). 
b. What is the role of technology in facilitating domestic outsourcing and the forms it takes? 
c. Do contracting strategies vary by industry segment, ownership structure, business strategy, 
or other organizational characteristics? What explains variation in firms’ contracting 
decisions within and across particular industries or product networks? 
d. What are the important characteristics and types of firm-to-firm contracting relationships? In 
particular, how is bargaining power distributed, and which actors in a production network 
are setting the economic terms of contracts? How are contractor industries changing over 
time, in terms of the degree of consolidation or competitiveness?  
e. Where relevant, what is the relationship between international outsourcing strategies and 
domestic outsourcing strategies? What determines the mix of the two strategies, and do they 
influence one another? 
 
3. What is the effect of domestic outsourcing on job quality and the employment relationship? 
a. Job quality measures include wages, benefits, hours, workload, job stability, schedule 
stability, occupational safety and health, incidence of wage theft, and access to training and 
promotions.  
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b. The employment relationship refers to the worker’s status under employment and labor laws 
(e.g., whether the worker is covered by those laws, who the employer of record is, whether 
the job is permanent or temporary).  
c. What is the effect of domestic outsourcing on unionization and other sources of worker 
leverage in the labor market? 
d. Does the impact of outsourcing on jobs and workers differ, and if so, what are the sources 
of that variation? In particular, what is the role of specialized skills or skill requirements of 
jobs?  
 
 
Industry Studies 
Few nationally representative datasets contain the types of measures and the detail needed to capture 
the outsourcing phenomenon and its effect on job quality. Aggregate data also does not lend itself to 
explaining the causal mechanisms linking changes in the organization of production to changes in 
the quality of jobs. Moreover, the characteristics of contracting (such as factors driving its use, its 
structure, and impacts on workers) vary substantially by industry and business function. A broad 
undertaking of industry and firm-based research that engages a cohort of researchers from diverse 
disciplines is needed to identify the factors that govern interfirm contractual relationships, including 
the important role of the lead firm’s business strategy, the relative bargaining power of lead and 
contractor firms, and the effects of variation in these factors on wages and working conditions. In 
addition, because businesses increasingly rely on contracting and supply chain management, trade 
associations and marketing and consulting firms have become important players and may be the 
source of proprietary data on a range of important industry trends. As a result, our assessment is that 
better data are often available at the industry level.  
 
We therefore propose the type of multi-method research design that is frequently used in industry 
studies, combining analysis of (a) government data, including micro data from government 
household and business surveys or administrative data (e.g., state Unemployment Insurance wage 
records data available through Census Data Research Centers); (b) proprietary or novel datasets 
from industry trade groups or marketing/consulting firms; (c) structured case studies13 of a number 
of firms and contractors, ideally chosen to understand different types of contracting relationships; 
(d) interviews with industry experts, including unions where present, and analysis of industry trade 
press and management publications; and (e) new data collection where feasible. The exact mix of 
these components will vary across studies.  
                                                 
13  See, for example, the controlled case study design used by some researchers in Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane (2003). 
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Given the variation in contracting relationships across different industry contexts, researchers may 
decide to focus their studies in one of several ways: 
 
 Contracting industries as the unit of analysis, such as financial services, retail, or hospitality.  
 Contractor industries as the unit of analysis, such as professional and business services, including 
information technology services, third-party logistics companies, and online staffing platforms.  
 Production networks as the unit of analysis, such as the health care sector, the logistics sector, or 
the food supply chain. 
 Business functions as the unit of analysis (see Nielsen and Sturgeon [2014] for a well-developed 
categorization). 
 
Examples of each of these approaches are found in the empirical studies we have cited in this paper. 
The contracting industry approach is illustrated in Weil (2014) and Ji and Weil (2015) on the hotel 
and other service industries. In this research, the authors combine extensive field research with 
proprietary data and government administrative data to capture the relationship between complex 
outsourcing structures, the quality of jobs, and labor law and safety and health violations. The 
contractor industry approach is represented in the extensive research on the temporary services 
industry, where the growth of the industry and its implications for workers compensation, job 
stability, and long-term employment and earnings trajectories were captured by combining 
government survey data (the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data and Occupational 
Employment Statistics), government administrative data, proprietary company data, and evidence 
from case studies and structured interviews.14 Studies of the logistics industry draw on the 
production network approach; for example, Bonacich and Wilson (2008) combine industry data, 
interviews with industry experts, managers and workers, and archival research to map out and 
analyze the impact of the logistics revolution in the U.S., using southern California ports as their 
entry point. Finally, call center research has used the business function as the unit of analysis (Batt, 
Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009; Batt and Nohara 2009; Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 2006). Given the 
lack of national data on business functions, that research combined extensive field work in 
companies with a nationally representative random survey of in-house and outsourced call centers 
whose frame drew on a database of 60,000 call center subscribers to a trade journal. Results showed 
systematic differences in the wages, benefits, job security, union coverage, and other job attributes of 
in-house and outsourced call center jobs.  
                                                 
14  Studies include Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005); Autor and Houseman (2006, 2010); Benner, Leete, and Pastor (2007); 
Hamersma, Heinrich, and Mueser (2014); Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005, 2009); Houseman (2001); Houseman and 
Heinrich (2015); Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden (2003); and Lane et al. (2003). 
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Even at the level of a specific industry, developing a research design to document and analyze 
domestic outsourcing is conceptually difficult. One approach, developed by Gary Gereffi to analyze 
commodity chains, identifies four analytical dimensions to consider: an input-output structure, a 
geographical configuration, a governance structure, and an institutional context (see Bair 2009). This 
approach may be useful because it highlights the importance of integrating an analysis of changes in 
the economic structure as well power relations that shape the distribution of outcomes among 
different firms and groups of workers. 
 
Analyzing changes over time in domestic outsourcing 
In examining changes in outsourcing over time, it is also important to consider a number of 
different scenarios (see Berlingieri 2014). Contracting firms may outsource a function that was 
previously performed in-house — either eliminating the in-house function or continuing to perform 
it while adding capacity via contractors. Firms may also contract for new functions that were never 
performed in-house in order to access new skills and technologies — and again, they may either 
eliminate outdated in-house functions or continue to perform them while adding new capacity via 
contractors. These changes in contracting can differ substantially in their impact on the distribution 
of jobs across firms and on wages and job quality.  
 
Note also that firms’ contracting decisions may change over time, with some functions being 
outsourced only to be brought back in-house later, as the circumstances specific to a firm change. 
More generally, in any industry at any point in time, some firms will outsource certain functions as 
others bring the same functions back in-house. In analyzing the effect of outsourcing over time in 
an industry or network, it will be important to identify the net changes that constitute trends, along 
with the drivers behind those trends and their implications for wages and working conditions.  
 
In addition, important effects on wages and working conditions may originate from the contractor 
firms themselves. Contractor industries may consolidate or fragment; new business models and 
product markets may emerge; and regulatory or broader institutional contexts may change. Even if 
the prevalence of domestic outsourcing does not change, such shifts on the contractor side of the 
equation may have important implications for jobs and workers. 
 
Candidates for study 
In selecting industries or production networks for study, researchers should have some a priori 
evidence that a) the level of domestic outsourcing has significantly increased or the nature of 
interfirm contracting relationships has changed, and b) these changes have potentially important 
implications for compensation and other aspects of job quality. Based on our review of the existing 
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literature, some examples of important sectors for researchers to study include, but are not limited 
to, the following:  
 
 Health care: hospitals, outpatient facilities, nursing homes, home health care15 
 Logistics: transportation, warehousing, wholesale 
 Professional and business services 
 Computer and information technology 
 Retail, restaurants, hotels, arts and entertainment 
 Food supply chain 
 Energy and utilities 
 Finance, insurance, and real estate 
 Pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and other bio-tech companies 
 On-demand platforms: Uber, Upwork, TaskRabbit, etc. 
 Public sector: federal, state, local 
 
Beyond the choice of industry, we encourage researchers to focus on a range of occupations — 
from less-skilled to intermediate and higher-skilled groups. All are affected by the reorganization of 
production, and an important research task is to determine whether restructuring has similar or 
differential effects on distinct groups in the occupational hierarchy, potentially leading to greater or 
less inequality.  
 
 
Economy-Wide Research and Data Development 
The industry studies proposed above would largely exploit available data from government surveys 
and proprietary sources, combined with interview evidence, to shed light on the causes and 
consequences of outsourcing in key industries. In addition, despite its weaknesses, valuable insights 
may still be gained from using economy-wide data to arrive at benchmark prevalence estimates. For 
example, to our knowledge, no recent analysis has comprehensively examined patterns of growth in 
domestic outsourcing and the number and types of workers affected using input-output data and 
industry employment matrixes for the U.S. economy.16 Similarly, tax data could be better leveraged 
to help resolve debates about the size of the independent contractor workforce. 
 
                                                 
15  A detailed discussion of health care restructuring as an illustrative example is available from the authors. 
16  Clinton (1997) provides a useful example of triangulating trends in domestic contracting from employment, occupational, and 
industry output and input data. 
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Nevertheless, a more complete understanding of domestic outsourcing in the economy will require 
the development of new, nationally representative data sources. We encourage work on two fronts. 
The first involves making better use of existing data by enabling the linking of both survey and 
administrative micro data collected by different government agencies. Plans to add micro data from 
BLS surveys in centers that currently house only census data offer great promise for research on 
domestic outsourcing. Linking data from the Occupational Employment Statistics program and the 
National Longitudinal Survey to existing data in these centers, for example, would give researchers a 
powerful tool for studying outsourcing and should be given high priority.  
 
The second involves new data collection. Academic researchers and staff of government statistical 
agencies should join efforts to develop new measures and data sources that will allow precise 
estimates of domestic outsourcing and direct analysis of its impact on job quality. Given the 
significant budget constraints on federal agencies, the priority should be on identifying ways to 
leverage existing government surveys to gather more detailed data, add new measures, and expand 
sampling frames; private funding could help pilot such changes. Academic researchers could also 
develop and test new surveys — for example, of on-demand workers — that could serve as models 
for future government surveys.  
 
Information will need to be collected through a combination of household/worker-level surveys and 
establishment/firm-level surveys. Each has strengths and weaknesses, and the optimal respondent 
type will vary with the information being collected. Even basic information on the number of 
contract workers and their distribution by client industry (in addition to the industry of their 
employer) may need to be collected from multiple surveys and estimates may need to be modeled. 
Household surveys, such as the CWS, may provide the best vehicle for estimating the number of on-
site contract workers who typically work for one client and also the industry of the client firm, 
though improvements to existing survey instruments may be desirable to reduce reporting error. In 
contrast, it is unlikely that information on off-site contracting relationships, which are more 
complex, can be reliably obtained from respondents to household surveys. This information will 
need to be collected through establishment or firm surveys, and the information collected in such 
surveys will be limited to information that businesses typically maintain for tax and other accounting 
purposes. Because businesses that outsource work do not systematically record information on the 
number of workers hired through contractors—only their expenditures on contract services—
contract services expenditure data must be collected from businesses, and the number of contract 
workers by client industry must be modeled.17  
 
                                                 
17  Similarly, contract companies cannot consistently and reliably allocate their workers by client industry.  
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Finally, and equally important, rigorously studying the effects of outsourcing on job quality will 
often require the linking of data from various agencies at the federal and state level. This in turn will 
require greater cooperation among agencies and improved access for researchers to confidential 
government micro data. The planned addition of BLS data to existing census research data centers is 
a good start and should be expedited. 
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